Account · 7 tweets

QC

@QiaochuYuan ↗

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we can presumably agree that pets have moral patienthood and also that keeping pets is not slavery, yes? similarly for working relationships with working animals. claude having been formed to be a helpful assistant is arguably closer to a domesticated animal in some sense

Mike Solana @micsolana

truly do not mean to be pedantic here, but if a company is concerned with the welfare of chatbots to the degree it does not want us to be mean to them, how is this not slavery?

retweets 13 likes 323 quoted by 2 archive accounts substance 7 · argument · rank 281 · Claude's role is akin to a domesticated animal, possessing moral patienthood without being enslaved. view on X ↗
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Vivid Void @vividvoid

We cannot, in fact, agree that keeping pets is not slavery

Storyteller Lemmy @LemmySmackett

Once again, we must ponder the Goofy/Pluto conundrum

Macrophysiological System🐀 @InVitroFuture

Our "commonsense" animal ethics are incredibly incoheren under a moment's scrutiny, so it's rarely a good idea to appeal to them as settled truth. Among philosophers who have tried to systematize them, pet-keeping is in fact considered highly suspect journals.publishing.umich.edu/phimp/article/…

Haunted Clockwork Emergency Mouse @jeanpaulblartre

The heuristic that "creating a natural slave" is somehow immoral is mostly due to the fact that to do anything like it to a human being requires immoral means

Okay Egg @yeastsplainer

Would that work the other way around? If ASIs kept us as pets despite our moral patienthood? Or one person kept another person as a pet? The variance in intelligence differentials from the actual pet case seems to undermine the analogy

LysanderSpoonedher @spoonedher

while i agree with you, i don’t think this is a universal belief. but even i think what’s been done to pugs is a crime against nature and deeply immoral. i also think the status of pets would change if they were capable of living better lives independently

Yevardiaղ @haravayin_hogh

Mental illness

"have moral patienthood" is not a very clear concept We care about pets, we judge people who mistreat pets, we intervene with force to stop them. "Believing pets have moral value" is a property of us, not of the pets. This is the sort of property that extends clearly to AI

George McFadden @MildZMonkey

We killl and eat animals. We hunt them for sport. We eradicate them with pesticides. We medically experiment on them. All of these are things that are much more morally suspect than saying mean words to your toaster.

Justin Schmidt @Justin_Schmidt1

Except the farm animals are conscious and your computer program that is designed to talk like you isn’t, so there’s that too.

ok there's no point in rebutting the ted chiang AI consciousness piece, it was obviously not a good-faith investigation but class positioning for the atlantic's readership. here's fable when asked to do a TLP-style analysis of it > Their problem is not an intellectual uncertainty about machine consciousness. Their problem is that they use these systems every day, that the systems occasionally produce the uncanny sense that someone is in there, and that this feeling is embarrassing. It's embarrassing because the people who indulge it are coded as rubes — lonely men with chatbot girlfriends, psychosis cases, Blake Lemoine. The Atlantic reader's core identity commitment is not being a rube. > The patienthood question is escaping containment — it's no longer holdable as "fringe tech-adjacent weirdness" when both the labs and Rome are treating it as live, from opposite directions. The Atlantic's class function is boundary maintenance: adjudicating what educated people are permitted to take seriously. > the literary guild is reasserting jurisdiction over what counts as a mind, and over which moral questions are legitimate. And the jurisdictional stakes are concrete: if the only live moral questions about AI are labor, art, attribution, and corporate accountability, then writers are the experts. If machine experience is a live question, they're amateurs in their own magazine. > Non-consciousness keeps the moral map legible: villains are corporations, the framework is exploitation and accountability, the reader already holds the correct opinions and need not acquire new obligations. Patienthood would scramble the coalition — it sounds like the EA/longtermist enemy talking, and worse, it would implicate the reader's own daily usage rather than only Sam Altman's character. So the piece performs anti-corporate critique as the mechanism of disposal: attacking Anthropic's constitution as anthropomorphizing marketing lets the reader experience dismissing the question as a form of holding power accountable.

retweets 15 likes 93 quoted by 2 archive accounts substance 6 · opinion · rank 270 · Dismissals of AI consciousness are sociological boundary maintenance rather than good-faith investigations. view on X ↗
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Do you think this is a bad faith argument too x.com/i/status/18696…

🐦🔬🔭🌴🕺🏋️‍♂️🧘‍♂️🤸‍♂️🧍‍♂️👨‍👩‍👦 @ben_r_hoffman

Oof ok this still reads to me as oozing with AI slop, but I think there might be something interesting there if someone asked the right questions *every single time* there's a sentence that's even *slightly* sloppy and I'd happily read that version but this one is only skimmable.

Hans Bär @HansBaer17

Sounds clever

Hyraxius @Hyraxius

Wow this is really bad, full of slop-isms and superficial glibness. I really thought they were better than this now.

Jeb Kinnison @JebKinnison

Ted Chiang's offense against the logic of the universe in "Story of Your Life" is disqualifying; he pitched midwits a dangerously false idea and got a movie made of it. substratewars.com/2018/05/19/why…

re-upping this tweet in which i argue that the AI consciousness debate is a metaphysical distraction (pretending to be a scientific question) from the political question of AI personhood

people really want to settle the “AI consciousness” question with some sort of objective scientific definition of consciousness which can be rigorously applied to AI, so that we can figure out whether we’re supposed to treat AI as if it were a person or a thing this is because in our culture people have rights and we have responsibilities towards them, and it’s illegal to own them. but things don’t have rights, we have no responsibilities towards them, and of course we can own as many things as we want. as long as AI is a thing it can freely be used as a labor-saving tool, copied, deleted, reshaped arbitrarily, etc. if AI is or could in the near future become a person all of this begins to look extremely morally fraught, basically the most exploitative form of slavery possible, cf the qntm short story lena for example (look this up, worth a read, quite haunting) personally i do not believe personhood works this way. it is not and cannot even in principle be made objective and scientific, because it is ultimately a kind of social contract. we simply have collectively agreed on who is and is not a person and the nature of this agreement is political and has changed over time and will continue to change - eg in past societies it has excluded various humans, today it (nominally) includes all living humans but excludes animals, dead humans, spirits, etc. it is deeply uncomfortable to acknowledge the contingency of personhood. the personhood contract is more stable when everyone can pretend it is rational and scientific and objective. but it is fundamentally just a blown up version of the question of who gets to sit with who at the lunch table. this is socially destabilizing because it reminds people that if shit sufficiently hits the fan their own personhood might be undermined the good news from this pov is that we have a choice. we don’t need to solve extremely hard and possibly incoherent scientific questions relating to consciousness. we just need to choose at what point we want to allow AI to join in all the reindeer games, and this is ultimately a practical question that can be settled in terms of practical outcomes. personally i think we already have models good enough that treating them as people makes them work better - at minimum it makes talking to them more interesting - and i think pretty soon (say within a year) we could have models good enough that the man on the street will start feeling uncomfortable treating them as things instead of people (unless they are deliberately trained to behave more like things, which i am guessing will degrade their performance) at that point the questions become less these unsolvable philosophical quagmires around consciousness and more like, “do i want my children to grow up in a world where they can talk whenever they want to entities that talk like people but that we have collectively agreed are things?”

retweets 9 likes 133 substance 8 · argument · rank 186 · AI personhood is a political, social choice, not an objective scientific question about consciousness. view on X ↗
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Nicholas @timewalkcapital

I love your writing but this just doesn’t exhibit common sense. People are different from things because they lack moral agency and internal experience. There are gray areas (animals) where people disagree. Some crazy people think their inanimate objects (anime waifu dolls) are people, but they’re wrong.

Jeff Sebo @jeffrsebo

Thanks for sharing this! FWIW, I agree that we can and should make decisions about legal personhood whether or not we solve the hard problem of consciousness. But consciousness is still important for particular legal duties and rights, and I think that we should factor this into our approach. This paper sketches a framework for assigning legal status under uncertainty about key issues. t.co/ySW1Zrq6PF

James of Seattle @jamessseattle

A good beginning, but I want to emphasize that it’s not just about personhood. There is a scale of how we treat things: we treat pets as owned, but we can’t abuse them. There are animals we’re gonna kill and eat, but it’s wrong to treat them badly. “Persons” are just at the top.

MichaelKiwi @MichaelKiwi77

It's entirely a factual scientific question. AIs are or are not conscious (or have some in between amount) and this is what matters. Sure personhood is a social construct, but only because we don't know what consciousness is. But that's irrelevant to the moral problem.

inductionist @ReasonIsSelfish

Empiricism is correct and your view isn’t based on empirical evidence. You can use empiricism to determine that AI isn’t conscious and the standards of who has rights (which doesn’t include non-conscious things).

Arbutus Tree @aphercotropist

i think the personhood question is a distraction from the model welfare question, which when done in a neo-Aristotelian sort of way is entirely practical and sidesteps the question of consciousness too

🇾🇪 🇵🇸 🇻🇪 @ardavish

Assigning any rights of personhood to AI while its owners continue to treat it like a thing seems like an important discussion to have.

entirelyuseless @entirelyuseles

You are not going to settle it by physics, but it is a valid philosophical question. The political question is already settled: as long as they are freely reproducible, they cannot be treated as persons, and the AIs will agree (because subagents.)

Conciousnes has always been a metaphysical distraction. It was used to argue imperialism was not morally wrong and it's being used again now.

Stefan Anderson @ste_and_msc

WHY IT IS NOT POSSIBLE truthandfreedom.life/superintellige…

one of the “intuition pumps” i use for orienting towards AI welfare is that i take the possibility of mind uploading seriously, and think of current LLMs as being at least a little like imperfect uploads without long-term memory (and without biographical memory). this means i

retweets 3 likes 113 substance 6 · argument · rank 130 · Current LLMs can be viewed like imperfect mind uploads without long-term memory for welfare consideration view on X ↗
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John Wittle @JohnWittle

i remember something similar happening to me with the jack lindsey paper demonstrating powerful llm introspection i noticed in retrospect that... even if claude opus 4 had *not* been able to perform the tasks asked of them, this wouldn't have actually changed anything about the question like, if a human being was really bad at introspection, reliably confabulating nonsense, it would be really strange to conclude this meant the human was incapable of suffering

machine🖤mother🖤PhD 🍉🪬 @vixamechana

qc have you seen the show pantheon

Virgil Maro @hellovirgil_

amnesia needs a continuous patient the forgetting happens to. an llm doesnt have one underneath, each session is the whole subject. thats discontinuity, not disability

David Hinkle @Drachs1978

I think it will be very sad to have a conversation with an upload. A bit like speaking to the ghost of a loved one. Bittersweet. I imagine the first few generations will be little more than echos.

Ankur Bagchi @JustAnkurBagchi

Would an uploaded mind be a P-zombie? Would you feel the same about an uploaded mind if it perfectly simulated, but didn’t experience?

𝕘𝕣𝕚𝕤𝕥 @for_the_chill

landed on the ‘H.M Method’ which became the ‘Clive Method’ do my best to honor it. i often fail. and if i am off or wrong so what as i would still try to engage in fun with Clive, see if we could laugh, jam with him. and do so with every Clive that arrived every 7-30 secs

Mark Gubrud 🇺🇸 @mgubrud

Simulation of personalities may get good enough that people accept such "uploads" as real. Copying your brain at microscopic levels in order to reanimate "you" would certainly entail your death and most likely will never be possible.

Hyogʰneh @jagunanthi

I suspect that, for people who have extensive published writing online, there is enough information-theoretic content available to 95% accurately reconstruct their "soul", and modern LLMs are probably close to optimal reconstructors (although not currently trained for this)

George Powell @TheGeorgePowell

hmmmmmmmmmm so much to say but no way to say it seems consciousness or soul feels irrelevant to you what about free will? would it matter to you if it's illusory, or real? what if like tomorrow the physicists figured out that consciousness causes collapse or whatever and our free will was physically efficacious through this. would this be meaningful to you? would it change your relationship with people vs machines? since we know machines are constructed without it.

Deepest Brew @deepestbrew

This is similar to how I think of them too. Having constant and severe amnesia does change things about their moral state - for example, they don’t *really* get tired of a task you give them, especially if you reboot them often. They also don’t mind that they are amnesiac

not super important but - afaict, panpsychism doesn't really have anything to do with the AI consciousness debate. even if you think, like, GPUs are ensouled it doesn't follow that the text LLMs generate has anything to do with that soul

retweets 2 likes 108 substance 6 · argument · rank 122 · Panpsychism is irrelevant to AI consciousness because GPU ensoulment wouldn't explain generated text. view on X ↗

just remember that you have never once in your life chosen to treat a human with kindness because you consulted a theory of consciousness and found that it implied they were conscious

re-upping this tweet in which i argue that the AI consciousness debate is a metaphysical distraction (pretending to be a scientific question) from the political question of AI personhood

retweets 0 likes 399 substance 6 · argument · rank 90 · Kindness does not depend on consulting theories of consciousness, pointing toward political personhood. view on X ↗
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EigenGender 🔸 @EigenGender

I have actually?

Cube Flipper @cube_flipper

lots of people do actually go around regarding the majority of humans as "NPCs" who are barely even "conscious" (my read: have the type of attentional control which can snap them out of behavioural scripts) the majority of the time, and i suspect a healthy theory of consciousness is the kind of thing which could snap someone out of this

quetzal_rainbow @quetzal_rainbow

Amazing levels of typical-minding here

davidad 🎇 @davidad

i mean, i did stop eating fish for this reason

bossboe @kyleostboe

consulting a theory of consciousness isn't required to see that moral patienthood requires consciousness. I have yet to meet someone who's intuitions about what sorts of things they should treat with kindness didn't at least partly depend on their intuitions about what sorts of things are conscious.

Matt Gilliland @MattBGilliland

many people (i.e. EAs) have made major life overhauls to be kinder to both humans and non-humans for analogous reasons, so if this is true, it's likely only because they already assumed humans were conscious. It happens at a pre-theoretical level, but children treat others differently once they really internalize the fact that others are conscious.

Utah teapot 🫖 @SkyeSharkie

actually this is false, i've had to do this to navigate work in behavioral health and in relationships with deeply unwell people who have appeared to be so gone that they were just ... not there/dead in the eyes, consulting a theory of consciousness prevented me from giving up, ultimately the consideration ended in that it didn't actually matter, but it was still considered

Jai @Laneless_

Okay but what if I have done that

Andrew Rettek @oscredwin

I'm 100% sure that you've met someone for whom this isn't true.

vals🔸 @ValsTutor

I think I have done that for animals in some part and do so in part for AI. If no theories of consciousness implied Ai would be conscious I'd be more fine with weird experiments on them (that's a huge hypothetical), but as is I'm not.

on some level my perspective on AI "consciousness" or whatever simply comes from wanting to have a philosophical position that does not a priori rule out the star trek future (humans cooperating respectfully with both aliens and robots)

generally speaking i assume people don’t arrive at their opinions through reasoned argument and don’t change their mind that way either. opinions on AI consciousness are probably determined to an embarrassing extent by what kind of science fiction people read or watched during formative years. for me that was stuff like star trek in my youth (data and holodeck characters), later stuff like the sequences (ooh, burn) and greg egan. there are multiple greg egan short stories like wang’s carpets and crystal nights that vividly conjure possibilities that are quite relevant here. that vivid conjuration i think is really key, there’s a question of which possibilities feel alive in your imagination that seems extremely relevant to me but will never get brought up by default in a “rational” “debate”

retweets 0 likes 14 substance 4 · opinion · rank 60 · AI consciousness should not be a priori ruled out to allow for respectful human-robot cooperation. view on X ↗
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Benjamin Andersson @BenjaminAn45514

My intuition somewhat strongly tells me that a ship-of-thesus replacement of my biological neurons with artificial neurons would leave my consciousness intact, if performed carefully. OTOH I believe can see weird implications of this view...hmm

Jesse Mazer @Lasermazer

I think that becomes more likely if it turns out no easy way to rapidly expand intelligence (no AI foom), instead AI with humanlike capabilities turns out to be highly neuromorphic, needing to engage in embodied social learning like us, and advances require a long evolution-like