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Captain Pleasure, Andrés Gómez Emilsson @algekalipso · Oct 10

“To replicate consciousness you just need to replicate the right causal structure.” “What if consciousness is a topological pocket in the electromagnetic field?” “Then we replicate that causal structure.” “So, er, how do you replicate the causal structure of a pocket of the EM field?” “You coarse grain it, identify the computationally relevant variables, and reproduce their interactions.” “Computationally relevant. Okay. How do you know the things you discarded weren't what made it a single experience?” “Because we preserve the causal organization.” “Which causal organization? A continuous field doesn't come with a preferred division into computational components. There isn't even a closest point to any given point. You can describe its dynamics with differential equations, sure, but getting from that to a finite collection of interacting variables involves choices. What tells you those choices preserve the pocket?” “We can make the simulation as accurate as necessary.” “Necessary for what? Predicting what the pocket does to the rest of the brain? Or reproducing what makes it a pocket in the first place?” “Why would those be different? Parsimony.” “Well, suppose the field is doing something that becomes extremely expensive to simulate on your chosen hardware. Maybe some quantum contribution matters, and the cost of evaluating the relevant amplitudes varies enormously depending on what's happening. Whenever you hit the tricky parts you have to slow down the rest of the simulation while you work them out.” “Fine. We slow everything down. The relative timing is preserved.” “Yes, you can do that. But now there's a reason for using that substrate. The physical system realizes dynamics directly that your simulator needs an enormous amount of extra computation to reproduce. Calling both ‘the same computation’ doesn't explain why one is so much more efficient.” “Efficiency doesn't establish consciousness.” “Of course it doesn't. But suppose the physical organization responsible for that advantage also has properties we're trying to explain about experience: holistic causal power (the relevant operation belongs to the whole interacting system), boundedness (there's a physical reason this belongs to one whole rather than several). Now you have a reason to investigate whether the computational advantage and the experience depend on the same physical properties.” “You'd have to establish that.” “Yes! And you'd have to establish that your replacement preserves them. You can't settle that by identifying the input-output function and declaring everything else irrelevant.” “We'd simulate the internal dynamics too.” “Okay, then we're back to slowing everything down whenever the substrate does something your hardware struggles with.” “Or we'd use lookup tables.” “For the outputs of the tricky part?” “Sure. Same inputs, same outputs.” “But then you're no longer replicating its internal causal structure. You've replaced the whole interacting process with a stored answer.” “The rest of the simulation can't tell the difference.” “Okay. Let's keep going. Replace another part with a lookup table. And another. Wherever two parts interact, make a larger table that gives the same answers for the combined system.” “That could become impractically large.” “Sure. Assume we have the storage. Eventually we replace the entire human with one lookup table.” “You can't just replay a recording. It has to respond to different inputs.” “Of course. Include every possible input history at the resolution your simulation uses, with the corresponding next response. Actual inputs, hypothetical inputs, unexpected questions, everything. We keep track of the input history and retrieve the appropriate answer.” “Then it would behave like the human.” “Would it be conscious?” “If it preserves everything relevant, yes.”