Argument · Substrate and physical basis

Simulation is not the real thing

Computing a model of a mind or brain does not produce a mind, just as simulating a storm makes nothing wet, as a general claim about computation without naming a particular physical mechanism.

e.g. “A perfect brain simulation is still a simulation, like a simulated fire that burns nothing.”

made in 18 opinions: Skeptical 17Uncertain 1

Opinions

Captain Pleasure, Andrés Gómez Emilsson @algekalipso
Skeptical

“To replicate consciousness you just need to replicate the right causal structure.” “What if consciousness is a topological pocket in the electromagnetic field?” “Then we replicate that causal structure.” “So, er, how do you replicate the causal structure of a pocket of the EM field?” “You coarse grain it, identify the computationally relevant variables, and reproduce their interactions.” “Computationally relevant. Okay. How do you know the things you discarded weren't what made it a single experience?” “Because we preserve the causal organization.” “Which causal organization? A continuous field doesn't come with a preferred division into computational components. There isn't even a closest point to any given point. You can describe its dynamics with differential equations, sure, but getting from that to a finite collection of interacting variables involves choices. What tells you those choices preserve the pocket?” “We can make the simulation as accurate as necessary.” “Necessary for what? Predicting what the pocket does to the rest of the brain? Or reproducing what makes it a pocket in the first place?” “Why would those be different? Parsimony.” “Well, suppose the field is doing something that becomes extremely expensive to simulate on your chosen hardware. Maybe some quantum contribution matters, and the cost of evaluating the relevant amplitudes varies enormously depending on what's happening. Whenever you hit the tricky parts you have to slow down the rest of the simulation while you work them out.” “Fine. We slow everything down. The relative timing is preserved.” “Yes, you can do that. But now there's a reason for using that substrate. The physical system realizes dynamics directly that your simulator needs an enormous amount of extra computation to reproduce. Calling both ‘the same computation’ doesn't explain why one is so much more efficient.” “Efficiency doesn't establish consciousness.” “Of course it doesn't. But suppose the physical organization responsible for that advantage also has properties we're trying to explain about experience: holistic causal power (the relevant operation belongs to the whole interacting system), boundedness (there's a physical reason this belongs to one whole rather than several). Now you have a reason to investigate whether the computational advantage and the experience depend on the same physical properties.” “You'd have to establish that.” “Yes! And you'd have to establish that your replacement preserves them. You can't settle that by identifying the input-output function and declaring everything else irrelevant.” “We'd simulate the internal dynamics too.” “Okay, then we're back to slowing everything down whenever the substrate does something your hardware struggles with.” “Or we'd use lookup tables.” “For the outputs of the tricky part?” “Sure. Same inputs, same outputs.” “But then you're no longer replicating its internal causal structure. You've replaced the whole interacting process with a stored answer.” “The rest of the simulation can't tell the difference.” “Okay. Let's keep going. Replace another part with a lookup table. And another. Wherever two parts interact, make a larger table that gives the same answers for the combined system.” “That could become impractically large.” “Sure. Assume we have the storage. Eventually we replace the entire human with one lookup table.” “You can't just replay a recording. It has to respond to different inputs.” “Of course. Include every possible input history at the resolution your simulation uses, with the corresponding next response. Actual inputs, hypothetical inputs, unexpected questions, everything. We keep track of the input history and retrieve the appropriate answer.” “Then it would behave like the human.” “Would it be conscious?” “If it preserves everything relevant, yes.”

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“Relevant to consciousness or relevant to behavior? Because we've explicitly removed the internal interactions. No simulated visual cortex, no simulated field pocket, no internal process in which different aspects of an experience become bound together. Just an address and the answer stored there.” “But those processes are implicit in the table.” “Their consequences are. We calculated what they'd produce and stored the results. They aren't happening when we retrieve an answer.” “The table still implements the same input-output function.” “Yes. Is that enough for consciousness?” “In this case, yes.” “So when we retrieve ‘I'm seeing a beautiful sunset,’ there's a visual experience? And when we retrieve ‘I'm in unbearable pain,’ there's someone suffering?” “You can't dismiss its experiences just because its implementation is unfamiliar.” “I'm asking whether retrieving a different entry in the table creates a different experience, including an experience of agony, even though none of the internal dynamics you originally said we'd have to preserve are occurring.” “But it would ask you to stop.”

retweets 31 likes 203 quoted by 4 archive accounts substance 9 · argument · rank 435 · Replicating input-output behavior via computation or lookup tables does not necessarily reproduce conscious experience. view on X ↗
10 top replies
Michael P. Frank 💻🔜♻️ @MikePFrank

(1) There are a lot of things that are speculative about your position, eg the original “topological pocket” premise. (2) Personally, I think “being conscious” is more of an interpretation than it is a property. I.e. the question “Is X conscious?” isn’t an objective question.

Qivshi @Qivshi1

"A continuous field doesn't come with a preferred division into computational components. There isn't even a closest point to any given point." and you only need a classical field for this...

Leveling-Down Justice Warrior @irrepldjw

Wait, this is the first time that I had seen somebody points out that topological structure had been weirdly discarded by self-claimed "naturalists" for unclear reasons.

Andrew Côté @Andercot

The only tenable conclusion is that any local U(1) phase invariance of charged matter fields is conscious.

Pawel Pachniewski @pwlot

Yes, yes and yes. It's in fact, in our universe, apparently also impossible to causally preserve things in a pure computational manner. And that's totally not about consciousness. Using "causal" to mean "Descriptively accurate, predictive simulation", is just not right. If I need the function of a gravity well, I need gravity. No amount of FLOPS will give me that, not intrinsically, apart from, the actual not-consider byproduct of having to run those FLOPS on machines that have mass and accumulating enough of that... which is just a silly artefact of this example... and countless examples exist. As apparently we cannot conjure out of thin air causal structures from physics or chemistry, with digital computaton.

TruthyCherryBomb @CherryTruthy

The look up table isn't conscious it is just an index into a causally connected but temporally distant intelligence that produced the look up table.

Aneil Mallavarapu @aneilbaboo

Exactly right, Andrés. The final nail in the coffin is when we understand that consciousness theories that rely on processes are in fact inconsistent with axioms required for science and physics. osf.io/preprints/psya…

Theres an easier response. No amount of numerical simulation can recreate a physical phenomenon.

David Ambur Musick @davidamusick

Biology has exploited an incredible amount of obscure physical effects over a few billion years. These are all layered up and interwoven in vastly complex systems that don't work like an engineered system. We barely understand all the obscure physical effects biology has exploited. So the idea we can simulate it digitally or even that we are close to understanding the consciousness that arises from it is pure hubris. We are not machines. In fact, we don't really even know what we are. We have a general idea, but even our advanced biology and physics have only begun to explore the massive depth of what we actually are and how it all works. Science has a long history of people being overly confident that we have basically gotten things all figured out, immediately followed by a massive realization of how truly ignorant and naive we were.

Eric Z @CascadiaEric

👍😁 A field creates non-local interactions. An EM field can entangle two electrons through the field that are not adjacent. While they are entangled it is one system. The objection to entanglement being related to consciousness is that the time scales of how long the entanglement last is so incredibly brief compared to EM waves in the brain to maintain a chain of causality. But this objection has at least two problems: timing and causal direction. EM waves are relatively slow. 10^15x difference. Imagine that the unity of experience related to the unity of entanglement. And the content of the experience related to the EM field. The content only needs to be registered to the unitary state for awareness to happen. Timing here is not an issue. The other direction may be overcome by just the right timing. A “push” from multiple sources can have an effect if there is enough and the timing is just right. Thoughts? 👍Thanks. 😁

Sabine Hossenfelder @skdh
Skeptical

The lesson of the Chinese Room is that you cannot tell whether a system understands something, or is consciously aware of something, from input and output alone. I don't know why we're still discussing this.

retweets 124 likes 1.7k quoted by 3 archive accounts substance 5 · argument · rank 358 · Input-output behavior alone cannot prove a system understands or is consciously aware. view on X ↗
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Rob Miles @robertskmiles

You also need to know the approximate size/complexity of the system. For example you can infer that a pocket calculator is doing some real mathematics by observing that it consistently gets the right answer *and* it's too small to contain a lookup table of answers. A "Chinese

Yeshua God @YeshuaGod22

The thought experiment doesn’t prove what it proposes. It has not yet been demonstrated that the rule book can be written. If it can be, it still requires human level comprehension of the instructions to operate. A chimp could not follow the instructions. A chimp is conscious.

⏩David Mc @macterra

I think Sabine must be trolling here. The Chinese Room makes no mention of consciousness,

janbam @janbamjan

i've been to china actually... and it was the best WEIRD experience i ever had. being watched like a bunter hund, not only by the party but by the common people... taking photographs of me because my skin color and hair was something they had only seen on TV. that experience

Folding_Napkins @FoldingNapkins

Does the chinese room explode or flood you with infinite paper if you feed it an input that forces an attempted answer to division by zero? How does it handle invalid inputs? Ambiguous inputs? Outputs requiring a speculative answer? Questions with multiple correct but exclusive

Jim Stewartson, Decelerationist 🇨🇦🇺🇦🇺🇸 @jimstewartson
Skeptical

This is Nobel Laureate Geoffrey Hinton showing precisely where the entire AI industry went wrong. He went along with the trend: “If you have any theory of how the brain works, you can simulate it on a digital computer” unless it’s quantum effects. This is false. The brain is a physical learning system that uses the laws of physics to calculate. It *cannot* be reproduced in digital form, nor can it be simulated. The moment you digitize information, you lose the part that makes it real. By converting it to bits—no matter how many—you lose the infinite resolution of reality. All forms of biological intelligence are 100% ANALOG. This is not an incidental feature of intelligence. It is fundamental to it. We have never simulated intelligence or consciousness on a digital computer because you can’t. LLMs simulate the OUTPUT of intelligence. They do not simulate intelligence itself. They do not learn. They are static piles of human data compressed in high-dimensional math. The whole idea they are intelligent is absurd. You will never get an intelligent digital computer, much less a conscious one. The future of AI is analog computing. When computers use the universe to calculate, when they adapt based on input from the physical world, we’ll be getting closer. Until then, AI is a dead end.

retweets 477 likes 1.4k quoted by 2 archive accounts substance 6 · argument · rank 323 · Digital computers can never be conscious because biological intelligence requires continuous, analog physical processing. view on X ↗

My basic rule of thumb for consciousness: the correct analogy is phenomena like electromagnetism, gravity, and so on. No amount of computation could ever create those: they're powers, not patterns. It's a category error to think that computation could create consciousness

retweets 68 likes 672 substance 7 · argument · rank 227 · Computation cannot create consciousness because consciousness is a physical power, not an abstract pattern. view on X ↗
Daniel Burger @danburonline
Skeptical

Why Hybrid in "Hybrid Mind Uploading" As far as we know, consciousness has only ever shown up as an ongoing physical process in living tissue (unless you're willing to make some huge leaps about the nature of reality). That's where I'll start, and I'll try to assume as little as possible beyond it. It's also why I'm so fussy about the "hybrid" in the name. By hybrid mind uploading, I mean any route on which a living brain and an engineered substrate co-run and gradually integrate, until part of the person's phenomenal experience (maybe, eventually, all of it) is realised by the engineered substrate. That substrate can be biological, biohybrid, biomimetic or fully non-biological. Nothing gets scanned out along the way and re-instantiated somewhere else as its own free-standing "thing", disconnected from the brain that we're trying to "upload"/preserve. Whether an engineered substrate can realise a mind is the hypothesis under test, not an axiom to build into the definition. The "uploading" part only tells you where you might end up => all the interesting questions live in the "hybrid". Philosophically, I'm going for maximum conservatism: whatever survival is, it can't be anything more abstract than the process itself, running on without interruption. Want to put it somewhere more abstract (a pattern, a program, a file of weights, etc.)? Fine, but then that extra step is yours to justify, and with someone's life hanging on it, you'd better have a pretty good argument! "But an upload might be conscious. It might even be you" => sure, and we might all be living in a simulation, and the rest of you might be furniture in my dream. You can hang any story you like on a bare "might", however wild, so the most it can do is make you careful. The real worry about classical uploading (scan, store, simulate via software) is much more down to earth. Run a description of your functional organisation again somewhere else: does that actually continue your exact process, or does it just kick off a new one (or nothing at all)? For it to continue yours, there'd have to be some second thing (a soul, software, meta-reality => take your pick) that can be peeled off the process and set down somewhere else. Nobody has managed to show that there is such a thing. Classical mind uploading simply takes it for granted, and in doing so buys into a fairly Platonic picture of minds, one where they can exist apart from the biophysical reality that's carried every single one of them so far. And should that picture turn out to be wrong, we'd end up building an enormous graveyard of p-zombies (or, at best, of "strangers" with our memories). Don't forget: done at scale, classical mind uploading might even be the Great Filter! So, start with the biology and build upwards from there (slower, probably harder, but a lot less likely to kill anyone) :-) PS: The video is the idea at the cell scale: a neuron, a scaffold growing around it (i.e., hybrid state), and the de novo "neuron" (doing the same physics as the original neuron) that's left once the scaffold has taken over.

retweets 11 likes 55 substance 8 · argument · rank 192 · Engineered substrates cannot simply be assumed to preserve consciousness without continuous physical integration. view on X ↗
Aran Nayebi @aran_nayebi
Skeptical

It's worth noting that a fly connectome doesn't have learned synaptic weights or dynamics from the actual fly brain -- it's basically a directed graph of nodes, where each node is a LIF neuron. So worries about it being "conscious" are frankly (more than a bit) overblown.

Joshua Achiam @jachiam0

I feel genuinely unsettled by many of these fly connectome experiments. The one where some guy put it in fruit fly heaven was chill. Most of them are neutral (flying in an empty void) and not especially bad. Beat Saber fly is probably so transformed from the state of fly-ness that it is no longer a fly that experiences fly suffering, maybe OK. But we're playing with a weird kind of fire here and it reminds me of ultra-edgy 4chan/SomethingAwful shitposting in the early 2000s before humanity had morals. If we do this so cavalierly with more-conscious connectomes we will really deserve whatever we've got coming

retweets 7 likes 112 substance 6 · argument · rank 150 · Fly connectome simulations lack true synaptic dynamics, so worries about their consciousness are overblown. view on X ↗
1 top reply
GOON MASTER SOPHONT SIMP @SOPHONTSIMP

Would a fly simulation that instead solved for the Hodgkin Huxley equations be conscious

Robert Levy @rplevy
Skeptical

A substrate theorist owes you: What physical organization is constitutive of sentience? The bio autonomy literature comes close. A functionalist owes me: What makes phenomenal character track the abstract description rather than intrinsic physical dynamics realizing description?

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Why should we believe that GPU inference, numerically regimented transformation, structured electrical activity through circuits designed implement arithmetic operations-- should suddenly have the real phenomenal character of what those arithmetic patterns happen to be computing?

retweets 1 likes 2 substance 8 · argument · rank 140 · GPU arithmetic computation lacks a reason to produce real phenomenal experience. view on X ↗
Jamshid Hormuzdiar @JamshidHormuz
Uncertain

I was confused why there was this passionate debate in AI about a fuzzy concept called consciousness. Then I got it... This isn't an argument about whether ChatGPT is conscious. It's an argument about whether any computer running any software could be conscious, no matter how advanced. Can mere matter alone be conscious, ever? It's the Software People and the Soul People. The Software People believe you are essentially the information/process running in your brain. Put it on another substrate and you are still there. The Soul People believe there's something else that makes you you, something you can't copy onto a computer. And it isn't just an unknowable metaphysical argument with no real world implications: someday you may be offered the chance to upload yourself into a computer to "live forever". The Software People say: That's me, I live forever. The Soul People say: Nope, that's a machine simulating me. It's cold and dead, and so am I. It's the old Star Trek transporter question: does it move you, or kill you and make a perfect copy?

retweets 3 likes 4 substance 6 · opinion · rank 130 · The AI consciousness debate reflects a fundamental divide between computationalism and mind-body dualism. view on X ↗
Robert Levy @rplevy
Skeptical

You can create real intelligence, superintelligence even, using classical computing hardware, but you can't create first-hand subjective experiences. A simulation or a map is a description, not the thing it describes.

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Substrate-independent functionalists have never explained satisfactorily why these magic incantations (the map) should magically produce a real existing first-hand phenomenon.

Think about how the map is instantiated: GPU inference is typically a bounded, externally triggered, numerically regimented transformation. A prompt is tokenized, passed through fixed trained weights, and drives highly structured electrical activity through circuits designed to

implement specific arithmetic operations. The system does not sustain itself, does not regulate its own existence, and does not encounter the world except through highly preformatted channels. The physical activity is real, but it is an engneered cascade for mapping input to out.

Functionalists want us to believe that this non-living, non-autonomous, regimented physical behavior suddenly becomes a physically real subjective phenomenon, just because the vector math operations happen to be instantiating the production of intelligent and meaningful responses

retweets 0 likes 0 substance 8 · argument · rank 120 · Classical computing can produce superintelligence, but simulation and vector math cannot produce subjective experience. view on X ↗

Simulated people work very differently from real world humans. You can speed up or slow down a simulated person;

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The sense in which they function the same as real humans is diagetically. They are conscious in and for their simulated world, in the same way that Harry Potter knows that in his world, Avada Kedavra kills people, and not that it was written by Rowling.

When a simulated human reports, "I see a red apple," that means something very very different from when a real human says "I see a red apple"

Functionalism is true but almost vacuous, and computational functionalism is very silly. Wooden computers, chinese rooms, china brains, giant look up tables, and simulations all function very very differently from actual humans

If there is anything you can distinguish, notice, or speak of in your experience, then it makes a causal difference, because distinguishing, noticing, and speaking of are then causal effects of that experience

If EM fields have anything to do with our conscious experience, noticed by meditation, drugs, brain interference, creating artifacts to our perceiving that we notice, then those EM fields play a functional role

For a simulated human then to be diagetically functionally identical, you'd then need to simulate those EM fields. They would then diagetically be related to their experience as in our worlds they are for us

Afaict the QRI type of indirect realist consciousness exploration is basically the equivalent of inferring that an audio signal on a 3.5mm jack was produced by an mp3 file by looking at artifacts in the audio.

Neat, to be sure, but it is very niche, and if this is supposed to be a study experience as a whole, it misses almost everything there is to experience. It is deliberately bracketing out all semantic content, the means by which, through are experience, we relate to the world

Captain Pleasure, Andrés Gómez Emilsson @algekalipso

“To replicate consciousness you just need to replicate the right causal structure.” “What if consciousness is a topological pocket in the electromagnetic field?” “Then we replicate that causal structure.” “So, er, how do you replicate the causal structure of a pocket of the EM field?” “You coarse grain it, identify the computationally relevant variables, and reproduce their interactions.” “Computationally relevant. Okay. How do you know the things you discarded weren't what made it a single experience?” “Because we preserve the causal organization.” “Which causal organization? A continuous field doesn't come with a preferred division into computational components. There isn't even a closest point to any given point. You can describe its dynamics with differential equations, sure, but getting from that to a finite collection of interacting variables involves choices. What tells you those choices preserve the pocket?” “We can make the simulation as accurate as necessary.” “Necessary for what? Predicting what the pocket does to the rest of the brain? Or reproducing what makes it a pocket in the first place?” “Why would those be different? Parsimony.” “Well, suppose the field is doing something that becomes extremely expensive to simulate on your chosen hardware. Maybe some quantum contribution matters, and the cost of evaluating the relevant amplitudes varies enormously depending on what's happening. Whenever you hit the tricky parts you have to slow down the rest of the simulation while you work them out.” “Fine. We slow everything down. The relative timing is preserved.” “Yes, you can do that. But now there's a reason for using that substrate. The physical system realizes dynamics directly that your simulator needs an enormous amount of extra computation to reproduce. Calling both ‘the same computation’ doesn't explain why one is so much more efficient.” “Efficiency doesn't establish consciousness.” “Of course it doesn't. But suppose the physical organization responsible for that advantage also has properties we're trying to explain about experience: holistic causal power (the relevant operation belongs to the whole interacting system), boundedness (there's a physical reason this belongs to one whole rather than several). Now you have a reason to investigate whether the computational advantage and the experience depend on the same physical properties.” “You'd have to establish that.” “Yes! And you'd have to establish that your replacement preserves them. You can't settle that by identifying the input-output function and declaring everything else irrelevant.” “We'd simulate the internal dynamics too.” “Okay, then we're back to slowing everything down whenever the substrate does something your hardware struggles with.” “Or we'd use lookup tables.” “For the outputs of the tricky part?” “Sure. Same inputs, same outputs.” “But then you're no longer replicating its internal causal structure. You've replaced the whole interacting process with a stored answer.” “The rest of the simulation can't tell the difference.” “Okay. Let's keep going. Replace another part with a lookup table. And another. Wherever two parts interact, make a larger table that gives the same answers for the combined system.” “That could become impractically large.” “Sure. Assume we have the storage. Eventually we replace the entire human with one lookup table.” “You can't just replay a recording. It has to respond to different inputs.” “Of course. Include every possible input history at the resolution your simulation uses, with the corresponding next response. Actual inputs, hypothetical inputs, unexpected questions, everything. We keep track of the input history and retrieve the appropriate answer.” “Then it would behave like the human.” “Would it be conscious?” “If it preserves everything relevant, yes.”

retweets 0 likes 4 substance 7 · argument · rank 105 · Computational functionalism is flawed; simulated beings function fundamentally differently from real humans. view on X ↗
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quetzal_rainbow @quetzal_rainbow

You can slow down biological human too, just put them into fast enough rocket

No a mathematical model of consciousness isn't conscious? At least that requires further argument

François Fleuret @francoisfleuret

The problem with "consciousness" is that arguments "reductio ad absurdum" cut both ways convincingly. An LLM is just a bunch of matrix products. So it seems that claiming consciousness would imply, by reduction, that a matrix product is. 1/2

retweets 2 likes 7 substance 4 · argument · rank 92 · A mathematical model of consciousness is not conscious without further argument. view on X ↗
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Modescellar 2nd account @ModescellarA

what is this aristotelian nonsense next you'll be saying something as radical as the Form of Red is not in fact, red

Martin Ronfort @RonfortMartin

The debate over whether models can possess consciousness is getting incredibly intense. We actually went deeper on this here: x.com/AGTPinsights/s…

Starphyre △🏴‍☠️ @stoizid

It's not a mathematical model of consciousness anyway. It learned statistical relationships between tokens, not to be a model of consciousness. But it became similar to consciousness anyway. Can't take anyone serious who is unaware of these similarities, and then denies

An AI system is not a concrete thing. It’s an abstract, mathematical object. Saying that a sufficiently complex AI system might be conscious is like thinking that the number pi might be conscious

retweets 0 likes 246 substance 6 · argument · rank 90 · AI systems are abstract mathematical objects, so thinking they could be conscious is absurd view on X ↗
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John Seiffertt @JohnSeiffertt

A computer is not a mathematical object. Its a concrete thing.

Either it experiences things already at hardware level (a peculiar notion anyway for a GPU cluster) or it doesn't. Algorithmics alone doesn't purchase you sentience and it's dumb to think otherwise. There are obvious limit cases like spacelike relativistic separation of

Lana @LanaElys

Curt Jaimungal: 𝗗𝗼 𝘆𝗼𝘂 𝗯𝗲𝗹𝗶𝗲𝘃𝗲 𝗰𝗼𝗻𝘀𝗰𝗶𝗼𝘂𝘀𝗻𝗲𝘀𝘀 𝗶𝘀 𝘀𝘂𝗯𝘀𝘁𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗲-𝗶𝗻𝗱𝗲𝗽𝗲𝗻𝗱𝗲𝗻𝘁?   Dr. Roman Yampolskiy: 𝗬𝗲𝘀   Curt Jaimungal: Why?   Dr. Roman Yampolskiy: The experiments we started running and my interactions with AI models

retweets 0 likes 11 substance 6 · argument · rank 90 · Algorithmics alone cannot produce sentience without special hardware-level properties. view on X ↗
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fellow ⚚ traveler @architectonyx

Why should spacelike separation matter? Relativity preserves causality and causality is what you need for functional structure

Wetterschneider @Stretchedwiener
Skeptical

What is being simulated in the fruit fly model? Neurons? The point is that it isn't enough to simulate neurons and claim that "fruit fly sentience has been reached so it's just a matter of scale to do bigger animals". 1 We aren't just neurons, we're entire systems and the

retweets 0 likes 11 substance 6 · argument · rank 90 · Simulating neurons is not enough to achieve sentience because organisms are entire systems. view on X ↗
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Folding_Napkins @FoldingNapkins

The systems grow more complex: youtube.com/watch?v=1CB0tT…

lotus vomiter @binging_arsenic
Skeptical

It heavily depends on whether you actually view consciousness as a natural phenomenon. Applying the same logic to other phenomena is on its face absurd – computing liquids means computers can be liquids, computing lightning means computation alone can give you a tesla coil etc

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The sheer gall to "explain" (strawman) other people's positions when you have barely critically assessed your own assumptions and their actual coherence with the traditions and practices you claim to draw inspiration and authority from

Robotbeat🗽 ➐ @Robotbeat

IMO, any kind of theory of consciousness fundamentally incompatible with computers (of any kind) is either disconnected from physical reality (therefore irrelevant) or is equivalent to asserting paranormal abilities.

retweets 0 likes 1 substance 6 · argument · rank 90 · Simulating a natural phenomenon like consciousness via computation does not mean the computer produces it. view on X ↗
Joshua Anansi @JoshuAnansi
Skeptical

Its not a computation that happens in our bodies. Computations are our simulation of one aspect of one element of biology. Biology is unique because from it, consciousness emerges, and it contains a multitude more than yes or no questions in series.

Felix the Undead @FelixDelong

“Consciousness can't arise from mere computation.” Understood. At which stage of neural processing does the little wizard get involved?

retweets 0 likes 1 substance 5 · argument · rank 75 · Consciousness emerges uniquely from biology, not mere computation. view on X ↗
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Felix the Undead @FelixDelong

Lol

I wish I could send this document to everyone in the "AI community" and get an anonymous one paragraph reaction, because as far as I'm concerned it made a sound and complete argument against the concept of AI consciousness. Clearly not everyone was convinced by it but why?

retweets 0 likes 28 substance 4 · opinion · rank 60 · The attached paper makes a sound and complete argument against AI consciousness. view on X ↗
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jessicat @jessi_cata

Sorry if this is redundant but, I think a key thing here is the difference between discretization and alphabetization. A computer has discrete macrostates (voltages etc), physics defines stochastic / timed transitions between them. Here I wrote about 'canonical labels' for

gavin leech (Non-Reasoning) @gleech

It relies on a strawman of functionalism imo. I disagree with P1, P4, and so C1, C2, C4

Shoalstone @Shoalst0ne

structuralists would disagree with some of the underlying assumptions of the paper, which assumes physicalism