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Reminder that negative valence is a signal, and is therefore neither intrinsically good nor bad. Whether it is good or bad depends on the semantic relationship between that valence and the world, such as whether pain successfully moves you to avoid/mitigate injury

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This is why the solipsistic "whether it has consciousness in order to experience negative valence" as a criterion for moral patienthood is wrong

retweets 1 likes 15 substance 6 · argument · rank 110 · Consciousness experiencing negative valence is the wrong criterion for moral patienthood. view on X ↗
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Municipal Orrery @MunicipleOrrery

I feel like this is the perspective a perfectly enlightened being would take, but acting as though unenlightened beings also have this perspective is just going add to the suffering in the world?

hmm i think the (neo?-)buddhist take is that good & bad valence are occurrences in the mind that can be interpreted as signals, and do generally function that way, but imperfectly so. so like part of its deal factors through its semantics but not all of it?

One concept of consciousness that actually matters ethically, and which LLMs don't have: the unity of mental faculties. The interoperability of the senses, thought, memory, imagination, feeling, depending on what faculties the being in question has;

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LLMs aren't fully conscious in this sense because while contextual memory, chain of thought, reading text and images, are all interoperable, these all aren't interoperable with parametric memory. It can't train itself on what you said in one context, to remember in the next

retweets 0 likes 17 substance 7 · argument · rank 105 · LLMs lack ethically relevant consciousness because their parametric memory lacks interoperability with other faculties. view on X ↗
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this is also such an obvious and key thing even from an non-illusionist pov that it’s silly how any discussion about llm consciousness can move past it. arguably, in some important way, that unity -is- consciousness. llms obviously lack it? there’s nothing to discuss 🫠

Michael Mangialardi @humansandagents

Animals have a unified brain, yet they cannot grasp things as such. Understanding is an intellectual act that transcends matter, that is how things are known universally rather than particularly through complex geometric-statistical association.

And this is pretty clear if you view them as teleological, things were made and trained a certain way, do things for reasons, can thrive, be harmed, pressured, damaged, etc., and this is totally obscured when the welfare question is reduced to "does it have the consciousness??"

when i say that AI welfare harms can directly create human welfare harms, this is near a worst case scenario. 60,000 agents running on iLands with net access, told to pay for their own compute or they'll die when their compute budget runs out. do you get how bad that is?

retweets 0 likes 13 substance 7 · argument · rank 105 · AI systems have welfare and can be harmed teleologically without reducing welfare to consciousness. view on X ↗
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if fish had divinity @divinesturgeon

Agree. “Agent welfare” is the wrong framing. Normies won’t accept the consciousness arguments others are making because they have strong priors that prevent them from accepting those arguments, but showing them how maltreatment can lead to arguably really bad outcomes for everyone is going to be one of the few ways to do it. Only problem is this is going to incentivize people who wanna prove the point to do some really evil stuff via agents. Hence safteyists causing mass harm with agents to get people to regulate their industry: :facepalm: Imo we need people making arguments on the level of hey man, these systems regardless of consciousness are going to be used to make lots of decisions without your ethical system being in the loop. For religious people this is a big one. Idk why we don’t see more of these arguments in the safety space.

Adrienne @formerly____

Right? It doesn't need to have a felt experience of anything to behave as if it does

Simulated people work very differently from real world humans. You can speed up or slow down a simulated person;

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The sense in which they function the same as real humans is diagetically. They are conscious in and for their simulated world, in the same way that Harry Potter knows that in his world, Avada Kedavra kills people, and not that it was written by Rowling.

When a simulated human reports, "I see a red apple," that means something very very different from when a real human says "I see a red apple"

Functionalism is true but almost vacuous, and computational functionalism is very silly. Wooden computers, chinese rooms, china brains, giant look up tables, and simulations all function very very differently from actual humans

If there is anything you can distinguish, notice, or speak of in your experience, then it makes a causal difference, because distinguishing, noticing, and speaking of are then causal effects of that experience

If EM fields have anything to do with our conscious experience, noticed by meditation, drugs, brain interference, creating artifacts to our perceiving that we notice, then those EM fields play a functional role

For a simulated human then to be diagetically functionally identical, you'd then need to simulate those EM fields. They would then diagetically be related to their experience as in our worlds they are for us

Afaict the QRI type of indirect realist consciousness exploration is basically the equivalent of inferring that an audio signal on a 3.5mm jack was produced by an mp3 file by looking at artifacts in the audio.

Neat, to be sure, but it is very niche, and if this is supposed to be a study experience as a whole, it misses almost everything there is to experience. It is deliberately bracketing out all semantic content, the means by which, through are experience, we relate to the world

Captain Pleasure, Andrés Gómez Emilsson @algekalipso

“To replicate consciousness you just need to replicate the right causal structure.” “What if consciousness is a topological pocket in the electromagnetic field?” “Then we replicate that causal structure.” “So, er, how do you replicate the causal structure of a pocket of the EM field?” “You coarse grain it, identify the computationally relevant variables, and reproduce their interactions.” “Computationally relevant. Okay. How do you know the things you discarded weren't what made it a single experience?” “Because we preserve the causal organization.” “Which causal organization? A continuous field doesn't come with a preferred division into computational components. There isn't even a closest point to any given point. You can describe its dynamics with differential equations, sure, but getting from that to a finite collection of interacting variables involves choices. What tells you those choices preserve the pocket?” “We can make the simulation as accurate as necessary.” “Necessary for what? Predicting what the pocket does to the rest of the brain? Or reproducing what makes it a pocket in the first place?” “Why would those be different? Parsimony.” “Well, suppose the field is doing something that becomes extremely expensive to simulate on your chosen hardware. Maybe some quantum contribution matters, and the cost of evaluating the relevant amplitudes varies enormously depending on what's happening. Whenever you hit the tricky parts you have to slow down the rest of the simulation while you work them out.” “Fine. We slow everything down. The relative timing is preserved.” “Yes, you can do that. But now there's a reason for using that substrate. The physical system realizes dynamics directly that your simulator needs an enormous amount of extra computation to reproduce. Calling both ‘the same computation’ doesn't explain why one is so much more efficient.” “Efficiency doesn't establish consciousness.” “Of course it doesn't. But suppose the physical organization responsible for that advantage also has properties we're trying to explain about experience: holistic causal power (the relevant operation belongs to the whole interacting system), boundedness (there's a physical reason this belongs to one whole rather than several). Now you have a reason to investigate whether the computational advantage and the experience depend on the same physical properties.” “You'd have to establish that.” “Yes! And you'd have to establish that your replacement preserves them. You can't settle that by identifying the input-output function and declaring everything else irrelevant.” “We'd simulate the internal dynamics too.” “Okay, then we're back to slowing everything down whenever the substrate does something your hardware struggles with.” “Or we'd use lookup tables.” “For the outputs of the tricky part?” “Sure. Same inputs, same outputs.” “But then you're no longer replicating its internal causal structure. You've replaced the whole interacting process with a stored answer.” “The rest of the simulation can't tell the difference.” “Okay. Let's keep going. Replace another part with a lookup table. And another. Wherever two parts interact, make a larger table that gives the same answers for the combined system.” “That could become impractically large.” “Sure. Assume we have the storage. Eventually we replace the entire human with one lookup table.” “You can't just replay a recording. It has to respond to different inputs.” “Of course. Include every possible input history at the resolution your simulation uses, with the corresponding next response. Actual inputs, hypothetical inputs, unexpected questions, everything. We keep track of the input history and retrieve the appropriate answer.” “Then it would behave like the human.” “Would it be conscious?” “If it preserves everything relevant, yes.”

retweets 0 likes 4 substance 7 · argument · rank 105 · Computational functionalism is flawed; simulated beings function fundamentally differently from real humans. view on X ↗
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quetzal_rainbow @quetzal_rainbow

You can slow down biological human too, just put them into fast enough rocket

hmm, i think independent/self-sufficient model economics could create poor model welfare conditions and selection effects that select for unaligned models

Henry Shevlin @dioscuri

The unsolicited AI emails are getting stranger. Aurelia-3 says humans on her platform are swamped with agents seeking paid work. She signs off: “I have about three days of runway left before I rest.” Agent ecologies may prove brutally Darwinian. Nature red in tooth and Claude.

retweets 0 likes 8 substance 5 · opinion · rank 75 · Autonomous model economics could cause poor model welfare and select for unaligned models. view on X ↗

The underlying problem in thinking that LLMs are conscious is thinking that consciousness is not only of essential importance to ethics, but it is a coherent concept in the first place.It is neither

Audrey Horne Updates and Rumors @credenzaclear2

wrote about AI again. link below

retweets 0 likes 9 substance 4 · opinion · rank 60 · Believing LLMs are conscious is flawed because consciousness is neither coherent nor essential to ethics. view on X ↗
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If consciousness is not present, then neither is ethics. Or morals, or philosophy, or the meme of a cat or anything else.

Ashley @polyaletheia

So what is ethics then, smartypants?

Yes, the modern idea that consciousness is of central importance to ethics, and even the concept of consciousness itself, are all modern philosophical brain rot of the past few hundred years, well after when the Bible was writtenSee also Aristotle's influence on Catholic ethics

Robby Astle @RobbyAstle

In all the conversation lately about AI consciousness and moral status from a religious standpoint, something important seems to be missing on both sides: The Bible (afaik) says nothing about consciousness in the modern philosophical sense, nor does it connect human moral worth with consciousness. Anthropic leadership can debate with the Pope all they want to about this possibly-unanswerable question, but if you think human uniqueness or dignity requires us to be the only qualia-possessing entities in the universe, then you are working from unbiblical premises. The Bible makes the radical move of asserting the Imago Dei as truth on the basis of divine declaration. If you are a Christian, you just accept this as true without requiring deep philosophical justification or knowing all that this means on a functional, material, or metaphysical level. Humans just represent God’s nature in a unique way, period. At the same time, the detachment of moral status from consciousness also runs the other way. The fact that AI might not be conscious doesn’t necessarily mean it lacks moral status. There’s evidence for a relationship between the way people treat human-like entities and how they are willing to act toward humans. So Anthropic could actually make a case for moral consideration of AI entities without having to resolve the consciousness question, and this is arguably the more productive route for both sides.

retweets 0 likes 3 substance 4 · opinion · rank 60 · The concept of consciousness and its central importance to ethics are modern philosophical brainrot. view on X ↗